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Abstract—Domain generation algorithms (DGAs) are fre-
quently employed by malware to generate domains used for
connecting to command-and-control (C2) servers. Recent work
in DGA detection leveraged deep learning architectures like
convolutional neural networks (CNNs) and character-level long
short-term memory networks (LSTMs) to classify domains.
However, these classifiers perform poorly with wordlist-based
DGA families, which generate domains by pseudorandomly
concatenating dictionary words. We propose a novel approach
that combines context-sensitive word embeddings with a simple
fully-connected classifier to perform classification of domains
based on word-level information. The word embeddings were
pre-trained on a large unrelated corpus and left frozen during the
training on domain data. The resulting small number of trainable
parameters enabled extremely short training durations, while
the transfer of language knowledge stored in the representations
allowed for high-performing models with small training datasets.
We show that this architecture reliably outperformed existing
techniques on wordlist-based DGA families with just 30 DGA
training examples and achieved state-of-the-art performance with
around 100 DGA training examples, all while requiring an order
of magnitude less time to train compared to current techniques.
Of special note is the technique’s performance on the matsnu
DGA: the classifier attained a 89.5% detection rate with a 1:1,000
false positive rate (FPR) after training on only 30 examples of the
DGA domains, and a 91.2% detection rate with a 1:10,000 FPR
after 90 examples. Considering that some of these DGAs have
wordlists of several hundred words, our results demonstrate that
this technique does not rely on the classifier learning the DGA
wordlists. Instead, the classifier is able to learn the semantic
signatures of the wordlist-based DGA families.
Index Terms—cybersecurity, domain generation algorithm,
malware, transfer learning, word embedding
I. INTRODUCTION
Various families of malware require communication with
command-and-control (C2) servers in order to receive in-
structions, exfiltrate collected intelligence, or engage in other
malicious endeavors. Since hardcoded rendezvous addresses
are susceptible to trivial countermeasures once discovered,
malware often employs domain generation algorithms (DGAs)
to generate a large number of pseudorandom domains against
which connection attempts are made. This behavior is difficult
to defeat due to the asymmetric nature of the threat: security
professionals must deny access to the entire set of domains
that can be generated by the DGA in order to contain the
attack, while the malware author needs to control just a single
domain to maintain communication [1].
The problem of identifying malicious domains has been
widely pursued in the past decade, primarily with techniques
relying on manual feature engineering [2]. The first feature-
less approach to the problem using hidden Markov models
(HMMs) was presented by Antonakakis et al. (2012) [3]. In the
first application of deep learning to the problem of classifying
DGA domains, Woodbridge, Anderson, Ahuja, and Grant
(2016) showed that character-level long short-term memory
networks (LSTMs) were extremely effective at identifying
DGA domains with the exception of wordlist-based DGAs
[4]. Other authors have built upon this work in [5]–[11] with
both convolutional neural networks (CNNs) and LSTMs, but
improvements in detecting wordlist-based DGAs were limited.
The problem of identifying wordlist-based DGA domains
is challenging as these domains do not necessarily look
random. For example, a domain such as dhlpcscshdrvpcpp.com
(generated by the ramnit DGA) is considerably more suspi-
cious than a domain like middleapple.net (generated by the
suppobox DGA). The reason these techniques had poor
performance on wordlist-based DGAs was likely that they
were primarily trained to detect random-looking strings.
However, some recent progress has been made towards
solving the issue of poor detection performance on wordlist-
based DGAs domains. Yang, Liu, Zhai, and Dai (2018) pro-
posed a random forest classifier that used manually-extracted
features such as word frequency, part-of-speech tags, and word
correlations for classifying wordlist-based DGAs [12]. Pereira,
Coleman, Yu, De Cock, and Nascimento (2018) designed
a graph-based approach for learning the wordlists used by
wordlist-based DGAs [13]. While successful, their approach
required a large number of training examples relative to the
size of the DGA’s wordlist because they identified candidate
words by looking for common substrings between domains.
Curtin, Gardner, Grzonkowski, Kleymenov, and Mosquera
(2018) proposed the smashword score as a measure of domain
resemblance to English words, and developed a model that
utilized WHOIS information to attain good performance on
high-scoring families [14].
This paper presents a novel real-time technique for inline
detection of wordlist-based DGA domains. The main idea
behind our technique was that the validity of the context
inherent in domains could contain sufficient information with
which to identify DGA domains: unlike legitimate domains,
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which usually contain multiple words that are contextually
valid together, DGA domains consist of words that do not
typically appear in the same context. We thus utilized context-
sensitive word embeddings to infer the aforementioned context
validity. Combining said embeddings with a simple fully-
connected classifier, we were able to perform classification of
domains based on word-level information. To reduce training
durations, we used pre-trained word embeddings and froze
the embedding layers during the training on domain data to
minimize the number of trainable parameters. The use of
word embeddings that were pre-trained on a large unrelated
corpus also enabled significant transfer learning to take place,
which allowed for models that required minimal training data
to achieve good performance. This approach reliably outper-
formed existing methods on wordlist-based DGA families with
just 30 DGA training examples and achieved state-of-the-
art performance with around 100 DGA training examples.
Moreover, training durations were on the scale of minutes,
compared to some current techniques in the literature that
required multiple hours of training.
The technique does not rely on manual feature engineering
or the classifier learning the DGA wordlists, nor does it require
augmentation with external information, unlike [12]–[14]. In-
stead, the classifier learns to identify the semantic signatures
of the wordlist-based DGA families, demonstrated by the fact
that the classifier was able to identify DGA domains even
when their constituent words had never been observed in
training. We believe that this is the first work that applied
word-level embeddings or transfer learning to DGA detection.
While not in the realm of DGA detection, Fang, Peng, Liu,
and Huang (2018) used word vectors of Structured Query
Language (SQL) tokens and an LSTM model to detect SQL
injection attacks [15]. To the best of our knowledge, this was
the only previous application of natural language word-level
embeddings in the detection of malicious network activity.
II. BACKGROUND
In natural language processing (NLP), pre-trained word
embeddings are widely used to alleviate the need for large
amounts of task-specific training data. The approach takes
advantage of unsupervised training on a large unrelated corpus
and transfers learned knowledge to downstream models in the
form of pre-trained word embeddings. A critical component of
our technique is the context-sensitive word embedding, which
was a relatively recent development in NLP. It refers to a word
embedding that is able to differentiate between disparate word
contexts and provide distinct representations for polysemes1.
For instance, the word “bow” in “bow and arrow” is unlike
the word “bow” in “bow towards the audience”. Two popular
context-sensitive word embeddings are context vectors (CoVe)
[16] and Embeddings from Language Models (ELMo) [17].
We opted to use ELMo in our work as it was shown to
outperform CoVe in most settings [17].
1Polysemes are words that have several meanings.
The authors of ELMo refer to it as a deep contextualized
representation: deep being that the embedding is dependent on
all the internal layers of the bidirectional LSTM instead of just
the final layer, and contextualized being that the representation
of each word is dependent on the entire input context. An
additional essential feature of the ELMo representation is that
the representations are character-based and thus able to adapt
to out-of-vocabulary tokens by relying on morphological cues.
Remarkable performance improvements were demonstrated
for NLP tasks when previous state-of-the-art embeddings were
replaced with ELMo. The authors speculated that contextual
representations encode information that benefit NLP tasks, and
that the inclusion of this contextual information in ELMo is
the driving force behind the performance improvements in the
tasks. We will show that the contextual information in such
embeddings is useful even outside of traditional NLP tasks.
III. METHOD
We performed two preprocessing steps on the input data,
with the first consisting of removing top-level domains (TLDs)
when present. Removal of TLDs was performed as the extra
information was unnecessary to achieve good performance
with our model. Moreover, it is relatively trivial for malware
authors to change the TLDs used by their DGAs, and a
model that is able to identify DGA domains without requiring
the TLD information would be less susceptible to such a
countermeasure.
The second step of preprocessing involved splitting strings
into their word-level components. Since ELMo is a word
embedding, it performs best if its inputs are tokenized. While
there are multiple techniques for doing this, the Python pack-
age wordninja2 was simple to integrate with our codebase and
performed sufficiently well for our purposes. The wordninja
implementation assumes that unigram frequencies follow a
Zipfian distribution for computing the probability-maximizing
split using dynamic programming. As the algorithm is linear
in both time and memory, its utilization did not have perfor-
mance implications for our technique. Alternatives include the
WordSegment3 Python package and the WordSegmentationTM4
.NET library.
The pre-trained ELMo embedding was loaded using Ten-
sorFlow Hub. This version of the embedding was trained by
Google on the 1 Billion Word Benchmark dataset [18]. We
used the default key of the module’s output dictionary
to obtain a fixed mean-pooling of the contextualized word
representations generated by the model [19].
The rest of the model comprised a fully-connected layer
with 128 rectified linear units (ReLUs) and a logistic regres-
sion output layer. We did not incorporate dropout due to there
having been no indications of decreased overfitting with it
employed. The overall model architecture is shown in Fig. 1.
2https://github.com/keredson/wordninja
3https://github.com/grantjenks/python-wordsegment
4https://github.com/wolfgarbe/WordSegmentationTM
Fig. 1. The model architecture.
IV. EXPERIMENTS
A. Evaluation Metrics
We evaluated the performance of the models with several
metrics. The true positive rate (TPR):
TPR =
∑
True Positive∑
Condition Positive
, (1)
and false positive rate (FPR):
FPR =
∑
False Positive∑
Condition Negative
, (2)
were evaluated at different classifier discrimination thresholds
to plot receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curves. These
curves are useful due to their relative insensitivity to class
imbalance [20]. The area under the ROC curve is known as
the AUC, and is equal to the probability that a random positive
instance would be ranked higher than a random negative
instance by the classifier, where rank ordering is determined
by the output probability predicted by the classifier [20].
Since inline DGA detection requires low false positive rates
to be feasible for real-world deployment, we were particularly
interested in the partial AUC, which is the standardized AUC
for a given FPR ceiling [21]. For our purposes, we set the FPR
ceiling at 1%. With the same considerations, we also looked
at the TPR when the FPR is at or below 1% and 0.1%.
Finally, we considered precision, defined as
Precision =
∑
True Positive∑
Predicted Condition Positive
, (3)
and recall, which is synonymous with the TPR as previously
defined in (1). We additionally looked at the harmonic mean
of recall and precision, known as the F1 score:
F1 = 2 · Precision · RecallPrecision + Recall . (4)
The F1 score is a measure of the relevance of the classifier’s
labeling, both in terms of the probability that a positively
labeled instance is relevant, as well as the probability that
a relevant instance is labeled positive.
B. Experimental Design
The benign and DGA domains used in the experiments were
from the following sources:
• OpenDNS public domain lists5 provided 20,000 instances
of benign domains, consisting of a random sample of
10,000 domains as well as the top 10,000 domains with
the most DNS queries (in November 2014);
• Andrey Abakumov’s repository6 provided the algorithms
and wordlists for matsnu and rovnix;
• Johannes Bader’s repository7 provided the algorithm and
wordlists for pizd and suppobox.
The technique was evaluated with the following experi-
ments:
1) models trained individually on single-DGA datasets of
varying sizes, to measure the models’ ability to learn
from limited data,
2) models trained on multiple-DGA datasets of varying
sizes, to test the models’ capacity to simultaneously
learn multiple DGA families.
The primary aim of the first experiment was to assess the
binary decision process of the classifiers when trained on small
amounts of data. Each DGA was tested separately, and metrics
were reported by class.
Considering that a detection system deployed in the real-
world would likely have to contend with domains from mul-
tiple DGAs, the second experiment was meant to evaluate
the model’s performance in a multiple-DGA scenario, and
discover the degree of performance degradation when multiple
DGAs are involved.
In all experiments, the training dataset contained 14,000
benign domains, and the disjoint validation and test datasets
each contained 3,000 benign domains. Likewise for DGA
domains, each DGA that the model was to be tested against
had 1,000 domains included in the test dataset that would
never be used in training or validation. Of the DGA domains
that would be seen in the training process, we used a 80/20
split for the training and validation datasets, i.e. if there were
120 observations to be used for the training process, 96 were
included in the training dataset and the remaining 24 were
placed in the validation dataset.
V. RESULTS
A. Training & Evaluation Durations
A key advantage of our technique is the considerable
reduction in training durations. Due to the small number of
trainable parameters (comparable with the LSTM model in
[4]) and minimal training data required, the models could be
trained extremely quickly. On a consumer-grade system with
two NVIDIA GeForce GTX 1080 Ti GPUs, each training epoch
5https://github.com/opendns/public-domain-lists
6https://github.com/andrewaeva/DGA
7https://github.com/baderj/domain generation algorithms
TABLE I
FIRST EXPERIMENT: RESULTS FOR MODELS TRAINED ON SINGLE-DGA DATASETS
DGA Observations Training Validation Precision Recall F1 Score Partial AUC AUC TPRFPR<0.01 TPRFPR<0.001
30 24 6 1.0000 0.4440 0.6150 0.9709 0.9986 0.9660 0.8950
60 48 12 1.0000 0.6870 0.8145 0.9751 0.9988 0.9800 0.8860
90 72 18 1.0000 0.7860 0.8802 0.9824 0.9993 0.9880 0.9280
matsnu 120 96 24 1.0000 0.9010 0.9479 0.9893 0.9995 0.9890 0.9570
240 192 48 0.9978 0.9180 0.9563 0.9876 0.9996 0.9930 0.9180
480 384 96 0.9989 0.9500 0.9739 0.9889 0.9996 0.9930 0.9660
960 768 192 0.9979 0.9640 0.9807 0.9932 0.9998 0.9950 0.9700
30 24 6 1.0000 0.4870 0.6550 0.9482 0.9963 0.9380 0.8090
60 48 12 1.0000 0.6470 0.7857 0.9601 0.9977 0.9560 0.8240
90 72 18 1.0000 0.7890 0.8877 0.9723 0.9989 0.9740 0.9170
rovnix 120 96 24 1.0000 0.7610 0.8643 0.9695 0.9987 0.9610 0.9100
240 192 48 0.9988 0.8520 0.9196 0.9813 0.9994 0.9860 0.9010
480 384 96 0.9968 0.9310 0.9628 0.9863 0.9995 0.9870 0.9240
960 768 192 0.9928 0.9670 0.9797 0.9877 0.9997 0.9930 0.9550
30 24 6 0.9960 0.2510 0.4010 0.7843 0.9690 0.6890 0.3470
60 48 12 0.9957 0.4610 0.6302 0.8361 0.9873 0.7690 0.5560
90 72 18 0.9984 0.6410 0.7808 0.9198 0.9958 0.9160 0.7490
pizd 120 96 24 0.9948 0.7700 0.8681 0.9102 0.9953 0.9110 0.6180
240 192 48 0.9977 0.8780 0.9340 0.9734 0.9992 0.9860 0.9110
480 384 96 0.9900 0.9880 0.9890 0.9900 0.9996 0.9980 0.9380
960 768 192 0.9841 0.9890 0.9865 0.9586 0.9991 0.9980 0.6970
30 24 6 1.0000 0.2030 0.3375 0.7635 0.9563 0.6190 0.3490
60 48 12 0.9933 0.4480 0.6175 0.8379 0.9790 0.7690 0.3900
90 72 18 0.9962 0.5220 0.6850 0.8586 0.9872 0.8330 0.5950
suppobox 120 96 24 0.9855 0.6810 0.8054 0.8551 0.9870 0.8030 0.5860
240 192 48 0.9828 0.8560 0.9150 0.9112 0.9975 0.9420 0.6060
480 384 96 0.9936 0.9340 0.9629 0.9653 0.9990 0.9830 0.7620
960 768 192 0.9919 0.9770 0.9844 0.9887 0.9998 0.9980 0.8980
TABLE II
SECOND EXPERIMENT: RESULTS FOR MODELS TRAINED ON MULTIPLE-DGA DATASETS
DGA Observations Training Validation Precision Recall F1 Score Partial AUC AUC TPRFPR<0.01 TPRFPR<0.001
matsnu 100 80 20 0.9732 0.8730 0.9204 0.8768 0.9941 0.8900 0.5410
rovnix 100 80 20 0.9739 0.8970 0.9339 0.8992 0.9954 0.9090 0.6250
pizd 100 80 20 0.9727 0.8560 0.9106 0.8554 0.9934 0.8770 0.4620
suppobox 100 80 20 0.9708 0.7980 0.8760 0.8303 0.9898 0.8160 0.4130
Micro Average 400 320 80 0.9930 0.8560 0.9194 0.8656 0.9932 0.8733 0.5108
matsnu 200 160 40 0.9874 0.8620 0.9204 0.9183 0.9968 0.9340 0.6380
rovnix 200 160 40 0.9871 0.8420 0.9088 0.9122 0.9965 0.9150 0.6540
pizd 200 160 40 0.9876 0.8780 0.9296 0.9255 0.9970 0.9530 0.6450
suppobox 200 160 40 0.9874 0.8630 0.9210 0.9123 0.9967 0.9260 0.6010
Micro Average 800 640 160 0.9968 0.8608 0.9238 0.9171 0.9967 0.9313 0.6338
matsnu 400 320 80 0.9361 0.9520 0.9440 0.8859 0.9956 0.8920 0.5920
rovnix 400 320 80 0.9359 0.9490 0.9424 0.8830 0.9956 0.8960 0.5510
pizd 400 320 80 0.9375 0.9750 0.9559 0.8558 0.9960 0.8900 0.4040
suppobox 400 320 80 0.9376 0.9770 0.9569 0.8550 0.9959 0.8990 0.3810
Micro Average 1600 1280 320 0.9834 0.9633 0.9732 0.8697 0.9958 0.8933 0.4800
took less than a minute. Typically, fewer than 10 epochs were
required for convergence. Inference on the same system took
3 milliseconds per domain.
B. Single-DGA Experiment
The results for the first experiment are given in Table I. We
see that the models performed exceedingly well even with just
30 observations available to the training process, especially for
the matsnu and rovnix classifiers. The ROC curve for the
matsnu classifier is given in Fig. 2. Though it is not reflected
in Table I, it is of note that the matsnu classifier was capable
of obtaining a 0.9120 TPR at an FPR of 0.0001 with only 90
observations used in training.
The classifiers for the other two DGAs required more
training observations to attain peak performance, though we
began to encounter diminishing returns past 480 observations
(see Fig. 3 for the impact of increasing the number of obser-
vations on the various metrics for the suppobox classifier).
Interestingly, the pizd classifier actually performed worse
when we increased the number of observations from 480 to
960. This can be seen in the ROC curve (Fig. 4); if we
compare the brown (480 observations) and pink lines (960
observations), we see that the TPR for the lower range of
Fig. 2. ROC curves of the matsnu classifier for different observation counts
(single-DGA models). Note that the y-axis is on a different scale compared
to Fig 4.
Fig. 3. Metrics for the suppobox classifier with increasing observation
count (single-DGA models).
FPR suffered tremendously with the increase in observations.
C. Multiple-DGA Experiment
The results for the second experiment are given in Table II.
We see that the performance, while inferior to the single-DGA
setup, was still excellent and comparable to other techniques
in the literature. There also seems to be a performance sweet
spot at 200 observations per DGA. This is also visible in the
ROC plot (Fig. 5), where we see that the curves for all four
DGAs were lower for 100 and 400 observations.
VI. CONCLUSION
We presented a technique for performing domain classi-
fication based on word-level information to detect wordlist-
based DGA domains. This was done by using a pre-trained
context-sensitive word embedding (specifically ELMo [17])
Fig. 4. ROC curves of the pizd classifier for different observation counts
(single-DGA models). Note that the y-axis is on a different scale compared
to Fig 2.
Fig. 5. ROC curves for the second experiment (multiple-DGA models).
with a simple classification network. As supported by our
results, we were able to take advantage of the language
semantics knowledge stored by ELMo to achieve state-of-
the-art wordlist-based DGA domain detection with minimal
training data. The small amount of training data required for
the technique is especially noteworthy for defending against
malware families that generate small numbers of domains per
day (e.g. matsnu generates only 10 domains daily [22]).
Future work could focus on further developing the embed-
ding process due to its outsized contribution to the perfor-
mance of the architecture. Though the unmodified pre-trained
ELMo representations performed extremely well in our experi-
ments, there might be room for improvement. Being generated
from a biLM, the embedding could be amenable to fine-tuning
via techniques like Universal Language Model Fine-tuning for
Text Classification (ULMFiT) [23] to enhance its effectiveness
as a component in this DGA detection technique. We also
intend to investigate the architecture’s performance on DGAs
that have not been previously encountered.
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